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several provinces. Simulations reveal that welfare in the Canadian dairy sector could increase by 
as much as $1 billion per year if aggressive tariff cuts were made while moderate liberalization 
plans would yield annual gains of $234.5 million. Even large producing provinces like Quebec 
and Ontario gain from trade liberalization.  In comparison, a perfect competition model yields 
more modest welfare gains in the range of $15.6 million and $34.5 million. Finally, we show that 
the switch in the sign of the transport cost-welfare relation identified by Brander and Krugman 
(1983) occurs at transport costs that are too high to be policy-relevant.  
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Trade liberalization and inter-provincial dumping in a spatial equilibrium model:  
the case of the Canadian dairy industry 
 
Introduction 
The current of round of multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
is stalled. While a host of new trade issues have emerged since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round in 1994, the negotiations in agriculture still mostly rest on three pillars: 1) export 
competition; 2) domestic support; and 3) market access. With regards to market access, the most 
contentious subject is arguably the notion of sensitive products. The 2004 July Framework 
(WTO, 2010) called for the introduction of flexibility in lowering tariffs of products deemed 
sensitive mostly on the basis of non-trade concerns. In return for this flexibility, WTO members 
are to offer increased duty-free market access mostly through increases in minimum access 
granted under Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs). The July 2008 draft modalities for agriculture propose 
that a maximum of 4% of tariff lines be allowed for sensitive products. Canada and Japan have 
requested a higher ceiling and it remains to be seen whether other WTO members will agree and 
what will the compensation be in terms of minimum access (WTO, 2010).    
The issue of sensitive products is particularly important for Canada’s supply managed 
dairy sector. The dairy supply management policy is implemented by a national agency and 
provincial organizations. The Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC) is 
responsible for administering the national production system for industrial milk.  It is responsible 
to allocate industrial milk among provinces while the amount of fluid milk to be produced in 
each province is determined by milk marketing pools. There are two such pools in Canada. 
Provincial producer boards then allocate total milk production to dairy quota holders. Milk prices 
vary with the end-use of the milk. Milk used to make fluid milk and cream is sold at a premium 
compared to industrial milk. All revenues in a province are shared with the pool, and the milk 
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price at the farm level is a weighted average of the different milk class prices. The Canadian 
Dairy Commission (CDC) buys and sells butter and skimmed milk powder at fixed support 
prices to deal with demand and supply shocks that could prevent the achievement of a target 
return at the farm level once the national quota has been determined. 
The effectiveness of supply management in supporting high domestic prices paid to 
Canadian producers rests on the ability to control domestic production and imports of foreign 
products. Not surprisingly, trade liberalization is strongly opposed by producer organizations.  
Barichello and Zhang (2008) found that the over-quota tariffs of the TRQs shielding Canadian 
dairy products are set so high that even large tariff reductions would not be effective.  Clearly the 
use of watery tariffs was to mimic the import quotas that were replaced by the TRQs (Larue, 
Gervais and Pouliot, 2007). Huff, Meilke and Amedei, (2000) and Rude and Gervais (2006) 
computed tariff equivalent measures of the TRQ in the Canadian poultry sector and estimated the 
welfare impacts of liberalizing trade. In all cases, the results critically hinge on the output 
adjustment chosen in response to increased market access. Meilke, Sarker and LeRoy (1998) 
analyzed the potential increase in U.S.-Canada bilateral dairy trade flows following liberalization 
using a non-spatial synthetic model. Larivière and Meilke (1999) addressed a more global issue 
as they looked at dairy product trade for OECD countries. More recently, Abbassi, Bonroy and 
Gervais (2008) departed from the synthetic non-spatial framework of the previous studies and 
proposed a spatial equilibrium model of the Canadian dairy industry to investigate the impacts of 
trade liberalization.  
While the aforementioned studies rely on different underlying assumptions, they also 
have many similarities. Most studies investigate the behavior of producers at the farm level, but 
ignore vertical and horizontal interactions between firms in downstream markets. For example, it 
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is generally assumed that retail and/or processing margins are constant or are a linear function of 
industry output. Yet, there is evidence of increased concentration in dairy markets. Concentration 
in the European dairy industry varies across countries and products, with higher industry 
concentration observed in France and in the United Kingdom (Bouamra and al., 2005). In the 
United States, the market shares of the four largest processors of fluid milk, cheese and dry, 
condensed and evaporated milk are 43%, 35% and 47%, respectively (GAO, 2009). In Canada, 
14% of Canadian plants are owned by the three largest processors in the country, Saputo, 
Agropur and Parmalat which process approximately 75% of the milk produced by Canadian 
farms.1  Naturally, concentration at one level of the market is not de facto detrimental to the 
other agents in the supply chain as economies of scale and other efficiencies can be passed on to 
upstream and downstream firms. However, the rigid control of upstream production, which does 
not encourage economies of scale, and the high degree of concentration in processing and retail 
have institutionalized a multiple marginalization problem.2 The purpose of this paper is to 
measure the impacts of trade liberalization scenarios on the Canadian dairy sector through a 
spatial model of the Canadian dairy industry and to assess the incidence of imperfect competition 
in processing activities on the magnitude of the gains from trade.  
                                                 
1
 See www.dairyinfo.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=cdi-ilc for more details.  
 
2
 Dairy Farmers of Canada argues the opposite when it states on its website that: “Canada’s supply management 
system provides balance in the concentrated dairy sector” (www.dairyfarmers.ca/what-we-do/supply-management). 
We argue that supply management exacerbates social losses arising from concentration in processing activities by 
institutionalizing a multiple-marginalization problem. The volume of milk marketed is controlled by producers 
because they control the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC), which determines the volume 
of milk to be allocated to the provinces, and the provincial marketing boards which control milk production within 
provinces and negotiate prices with processors. In some provinces, retail prices are constrained by minimum prices. 
The system is designed to allow all of the agents along the marketing chain to take a profit margin.  Because 
producers control the regulatory institutions, it would be difficult for processors to exploit oligopsony power.                              
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The literature on spatial equilibrium models applied to the dairy sector is dominated by 
analyzes based on perfectly competitive markets.3 Kawaguchi et al. (1997) were the first to 
introduce market power in a dairy spatial equilibrium model. They developed a generalized dual-
structure spatial equilibrium model which allows for any degree of competition, from perfect 
competition to monopoly. Cox and Chavas (2001) introduced imperfect competition in both the 
input and final good markets. In their application, U.S. producers capture all gains associated 
with price discrimination in the downstream market. In other words, processors simply act as 
pass-through agents of producers. Abbassi, Bonroy and Gervais (2008) applied these insights to 
model dairy trade liberalization in the Canadian dairy industry.  
In this paper, we rely on a different approach to introduce imperfect competition in the 
dairy market. The model links five Canadian regions (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies and 
British Columbia) spatially. In each region, dairy producers act as a price discriminating 
monopolist in that they sell milk to processors in their own region at different prices according to 
the end-usage of the milk. Dairy processors purchase the input from producers and sell to buyers 
located in different regions. A few simplifying assumptions are made regarding the firms’ 
strategy space. While there are several processed products in the model, we assume that 
processing firms are specialized in the production of a single output. This is necessary to 
calibrate output decisions given the data available. Processing firms consider the Canadian 
regions as segmented markets and compete à la Cournot in these markets.  
Our model is similar to the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983). 
In our case, the assumption about the input market leads to a double marginalization problem and 
                                                 
3
 Spatial equilibrium models were first proposed by Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1964). Takayama 
and Judge (1971) relaxed the perfect competition assumption in their analysis of a price discriminating monopolist. 
Hashimoto (1984) generalized the previous approach by having firms located in different markets compete using 
Cournot conjectures. Nelson and McCarl (1984) used a conjectural variation approach to analyze departures from 
standard oligopoly models. 
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the reciprocal dumping is done across provinces as processors engage in interprovincial trade to 
maximize profit when processing and transport costs are low enough while imports of foreign 
products are restricted by TRQs.  As argued by Brander and Krugman (1983), reciprocal 
dumping is the outcome of a non-cooperative game that on one hand enhances competition while 
on the other hand creates sourcing inefficiencies because increases in consumption are supported 
by purchases subject to transport costs. The effects of trade liberalization in our model are 
different because the dumping is interprovincial and because of the supply management policy 
that induces a double marginalization problem.4 Finally, we abstract from modeling the support 
price administered by the CDC because it is essentially a dynamic tool to balance unexpected 
seasonal variations in supply and demand. Our assumptions allow us to treat our optimization 
problem as a linear complementarity problem which is solved following the procedure described 
in Yang et al (2002).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section develops a 
theoretical model of the Canadian dairy sector under imperfect competition that accounts for: 1) 
the existence of a production quota at the farm level in each region; 2) no interregional trade in 
farm output; 3) interregional trade in processed products; and 4) the existence of TRQs in dairy 
product trade. Section 3 describes the dataset and presents the calibration exercise. Section 4 
introduces two trade liberalization scenarios and reports the impacts of lowering tariffs and 
expanding market access on welfare, farm prices and quota values under imperfect at the 
processing level. We also analyze the same scenarios under perfect competition to ascertain the 
degree of magnification of the gains from trade due to imperfect competition. The final section 
                                                 
4
 A significant literature emerged following Brander and Krugman (1983)’s introduction of dumping. Baldwin and 
Krugman (1988) were first to present an empirical application of reciprocal dumping. Feenstra et al (2001) consider 
bilateral dumping as a foundation for the standard gravity equation in applied trade. Friberg and Ganslandt (2008) 
generalized Brander and Krugman (1983)’s model by introducing product differentiation. 
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summarizes the impacts of trade liberalization and their implication for Canada’s position on 
agricultural issues in the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations.  
 
The theoretical model 
Let 8K =  be the number of processed dairy products in the model (fluid milk, ice cream, yogurt, 
cheese, butter, skim milk powder, concentrated milk and buttermilk powder) and 5J =  represent 
the number of Canadian regions in the model (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies and British 
Columbia). The variables iQ  and iMSQ  represent, respectively, farm output and the market 
sharing quota (production quota) in region i . The constraint i iQ MSQ≤  assures that aggregate 
farm output is lower or at most equal to the production quota. Marginal production cost in region 
i
 
is defined by ( )si ip Q  and is assumed to be linear in output. Total variable cost of producers in 
region i is ( )
0
( ) iQ si i iC Q p q dq= ∫ . 
We assume that there exists a single representative processing firm in each region that 
sells an output k produced with a fixed proportion technology such that production of product k 
in region i is represented by ( ){ }min ,ik ik k iky x fα= Θ , where iky  and ikx  represent output of 
processed product k and milk going into the production of output k used in region i. The 
parameter kα  determines the technological relationship between raw milk and product k while 
ikΘ  is a vector of variable inputs other than raw milk. In what follows, we assume that ( )ikf Θ  
is a sub-production function characterized by constant returns to scale. Under these assumptions, 
the cost function of a firm selling product k in region i is ( ) ( )lik k ik ik ikG y p g yα= + , where ikg  
and likp  are, respectively, the marginal cost of processing and the farm gate price of milk used in 
the production of product k.  
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The demand for product k in region i is measured by ikz . The inverse demand function of 
buyers, ( )dik ikp z , is derived from linear preferences of the form: 
( )1 10( ,..., )
iKz K d
i i iK ik k kk
U z z p q dq
=
= ∑∫ .
5
 Let ijkt  measure sales of product k  by a firm located in 
region i  to buyers located in region j . Transportation costs for product k between two regions is 
denoted by ijkc . The constraint ik ijkjy t≥∑  guarantees that total shipments of a product from a 
given region will be no higher than its output. 
Imports of dairy products into region i above the minimum access commitment are 
denoted OQWikOM  and are taxed at an ad-valorem rate of OQkτ . Imports in region i under the 
minimum access commitment (i.e. in-quota imports) are denoted by ikTMAC  and are taxed at an 
ad-valorem rate of IQkτ . The constraint
OQ
jik ik Wik ikj t TMAC OM z+ + ≥∑ , guarantees that total 
domestic sales in a region plus total imports are weakly higher than total consumption in that 
same region. kMAC  denotes the minimum market access under the Canadian TRQ for product k.  
Let the parameter ikρ  be the proportion of import licenses held by firms in region i , such that 
ik ik kMAC MACρ≡ . The constraint ik k ikMAC TMACρ ≥  guarantees that imports of product k  in a 
given region that fall within the minimum market access commitment are no higher than the 
minimum access level implied by the licenses allocated to this region. Finally, define the world 
price of product k by Wkp  and let Wikc  measure the transportation cost between region i and the 
rest of the world.  
                                                 
5
 We refer to buyers instead of consumers and retailers because no distinction is made in our model between the two 
groups. Introducing strategic interactions between retailers would be appealing, but difficult to implement without 
data on purchases by individual retailers.   
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Imperfect competition in the Canadian dairy industry is introduced at the farm and 
processing levels. At the farm level, producers in each region collectively behave as a price 
discriminating monopolist, selling milk at different prices according to the end-usage of 
processors. Processors compete à la Cournot by determining their sales in a given region. The 
inverse demand that processors face in a given region is ( )1J ijkip t=∑ .6 The strategic game can be 
solved in two stages. First, the output of producers and the assumptions about technology 
determine the processors’ output in each region. In the second stage, processors simultaneously 
allocate their output across regions.  
Using backward induction, we first investigate the buyers’ behaviour in a given region. 
We need to solve the optimization problem: 
( ) 1
, , ,
max ( ) ( )
OQ
jk ijk jk jW
J d IQ OQ OQ
j jK jk jik Wk Wjk k jk Wk Wjk k Wjkiz t TMAC OM
U z p t p c TMAC p c OMτ τ
=
− − + + − + +∑  
such that: 
1
:   
J OC
jk ijk jk Wjk jki t TMAC OM zχ = + + ≥∑  
                  :   jk jk k jkMAC TMACη ρ ≥                    
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are:  
0j jk
jk jk
UL
z z
χ∂∂ = − ≤
∂ ∂
 for 0jkz ≥               (1) 
0djk jk
jik
L p
t
χ∂ = − ≤
∂
for 0jikt ≥                                                             (2) 
                                                 
6
 We assume that processors do not market imports. In this sense, the demand that they face is a residual demand 
once imports have been accounted for and imports and domestic products are perfect substitute. However, there are 
no substitution possibilities across products (e.g., cheese vs. ice cream). This assumption is made because it is not 
possible to obtain reliable cross-price elasticities to calibrate the demand functions at the application stage. Evidence 
from recent studies (e.g., Chouinard et al., 2010 and Bouamra-Merchemache et al. (2008) confirms that many cross-
price effects are indeed zero and that significant cross-price effects vary across countries. This suggests that there 
might be significant cross-price effects that need not be the same from one province to another. The fact that we 
could not identify and internalize them is a limitation of our study.   
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0IQWk Wjk k jk jk
jk
L p c
TMAC
τ χ η∂ = − − − + − ≤
∂
 for 0jkTMAC ≥               (3)  
0OQWk Wjk k jkOQ
Wjk
L p c
OM
τ χ∂ = − − − + ≤
∂
 
for 0OQWjkOM ≥                                (4) 
1
0J OQijk jk Wjk jki
jk
L
t TMAC OM z
χ =
∂
= + + − ≥
∂ ∑
for 0jkχ ≥                              (5)  
0jk k jk
jk
L MAC TMACρ
η
∂
= − ≥
∂
 for 0jkη ≥                                           (6)  
Eq. (1) implies that the buyer’s price is equal to its marginal utility while eq. (2) states that the 
buyer’s price is equal to the price paid to processors. Equation (3) defines the maximum price 
paid by buyers ( )jkχ  as the sum of the world price, transportation cost in the world market, the 
in-quota import tariff and the TRQ import rent ( )jkη . When imports exceed the minimum access 
commitment ( )0OQWjkt ≥ , eq. (4) implies that the buyer’s price is equal to the world price plus 
transportation cost and the over-quota import tariff.  
The next step is to maximize processors’ profits: 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1max  
ijk
J J J Jl
jk ijk ijk ik k ik ijk ijk ijkj i j jt
p t t g p t c tα
= = = =
− + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
The first-order condition (or the firm’s reaction function) is: 
( ) 0ljk ijk jk ik k ik ijk
ijk
L p t p g p c
t
α
∂
′= + − + + ≤
∂
 for 0ijkt ≥                                 (7) 
Each processing firm considers a region as a segmented market and marginal revenue must equal 
marginal cost in each market: ( )ljk ik k ik ijk ijk jkp g p c t pα ′= + + +  (for an interior solution). 
Processor i’s price of good k  for sales in region j  is the sum of marginal processing cost ( )ikg , 
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marginal cost of the milk input ( )lk ikpα , transportation cost between the source and destination 
regions ( )ijkc  and a profit margin which is denoted by: ijk ijk jkMK t p′≡ . With identical demand 
functions across regions and no transportation costs, prices across regions would be identical 
jk mkp p=  and so would sales ijk imkt t= , m J∀ ∈ . Under perfect competition, 0ijkMK = , implying 
l
jk ik k ik ijkp g p cα= + + . 
The solutions to the processors’ optimization determine the inverse demands for milk of 
each processing firm. According to eq.(7), we have ( )' 0ljk ijk jk ik k ik ijkp t p g p cα+ − + + = . As 
mentioned before, the buyers’ demand for product k ( )( )1J ijkip t=∑  is a linear 
function : ( )Jjk jk jk ijk mjkm ip b t tϕ ≠= − +∑ , with 0jkϕ >  and 0jk jkp b′ = − < . Substituting 
( )1J ijkip t=∑  into (7), the reaction function of processor k in region j is: 
( )
2
Jl
jk ik k ik ijk jk mjkm i
ijk
jk
g p c b t
t
b
ϕ α
≠
− + + +
=
∑
. Solving the set of reaction functions defined by the 
first-order condition in (7) yields optimal sales: 
( ) ( )
( )1
Jl l
jk ik k ik ijk mk k mk mjkm i
ijk
jk
J g p c g p c
t
J b
ϕ α α
≠
− + + + + +
=
+
∑
.  
Sales in each region are aggregated to determine the demand of milk by processors of a 
given region. Using the above solution for ijkt  and constraints 1
J
ik ijkjy t==∑  and k ik iky xα = , the 
farm-level demand for milk by processor k  in region i   is:  Jl lik ik k ik k mkm ix A JB p B p≠= − + ∑  such 
that 
( )
( )
( )
1
J
J jk ijk ik mk mjkm i
ik k j
jk
J c g g c
A
J b
ϕ
α ≠
− + + +
≡
+
∑
∑  and ( )
1 2
1
J
jk kj
k
b
B
J
α−
≡
+
∑
.  
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The farm-level demand for milk is negatively correlated with likp  0ik kl
ik
x JB
p
 ∂
= − < ∂ 
 and 
positively correlated with l
mkp 0ik kl
mk
x B
p
 ∂
= > ∂ 
. An increase in the price of milk at the farm level 
in region m
 
increases the marginal cost of processors located in that region, leading to a 
decrease in their sales, but an increase in the sales of processors located in other regions. Hence, 
the farm-level demand for milk in regions other than m would increase.  
The inverse demand of milk at the farm level ( ),...,lik ik Jkp F x x=  is determined by 
solving simultaneously the demand of processor k in all regions:  
1 1 1
2 2 2
. .
. .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. .
l
k k k k k k
l
k k k k k k
l
Jk Jk k k k Jk
x A JB B B p
x A B JB B p
x A B B JB p
−       
      
−       
      = +
      
      
      
−      
 
Applying Cramer’s rule to the above system yields: ( ) ( )
*
2 2
1 1
J J
ik mk ik mkl m i m i
ik
k k
A A x x
p
J B J B
≠ ≠
+ +
= −
+ +
∑ ∑
. 
In the first stage, dairy producers are assumed to maximize profits: 
( ) ( )*1
,
max  
ik i
K l
ik ik ik ikx Q
p x x C Q
=
−∑
  subject to 
1
:  
K
i ik ik
x Qσ
=
≤∑  
                 :  i i iQ MSQδ ≤   
Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are:
 
0i i i
i i
CL
Q Q δ σ
∂∂
= − − + ≤
∂ ∂
   for  0iQ ≥                                           (8) 
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2 1
1
2 0l ikik iJ
ik k jkj
xL p
x b
σ
α −
=
∂
= − − ≤
∂ ∑
  for 0ikx ≥                               (9)  
1
0Ki k ik
i
L Q x
σ =
∂
= − ≥
∂ ∑
 for 0iσ ≥                                                 (10) 
0i i
i
L QM Qδ
∂
= − ≥
∂
 pour 0iδ ≥                                                       (11) 
Equation (8) implies that i i i iC Qσ δ= ∂ ∂ +  which states that in each region i, iσ  is equal 
to marginal cost ( )i iC Q∂ ∂  plus the quota unit rent ( )iδ . According to (9), the farm-level price 
in region i
 
for milk sold to processor k
 
equals the farm marginal cost plus the unit rent of the 
production quota and the mark-up due to the ability of producers to practice monopoly pricing. 
This mark-up is 2 1
1
2 / Jik ik k jkjPC x bα
−
=
≡ ∑ .  To close the model, we must introduce a condition 
that sets milk sold to a processor in a given region ( )ikx  equal to the quantity of raw milk 
implied by the production of the processed product ( )1Jk ijkj tα =∑ . In all, the model includes 12 
equations and 12 endogenous variables. Under perfect competition, processors simply act as 
pass-through agents of producers and do not act strategically.  Thus, instead of solving the first 
order conditions of Cournot oliogopolists, we have zero profit conditions for each product.  
 As argued by Melvin and Warne (1973, p.133), trade liberalization gains are larger when 
a domestic sector is imperfectly competitive provided that the rest of the world is perfectly 
competitive because the gains arising from a more efficient resource allocation are magnified in 
a general equilibrium setting. In our partial equilibrium model, trade liberalization can help 
mitigate oligopoly distortions from processors and monopoly pricing of raw milk that leads to a 
multiple-marginalization problem. Thus, we would expect trade liberalization gains to be 
substantial. To find out exactly how large the gains are in absolute terms, we rely on simulations. 
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To size up the importance of imperfect competition in processing activities on our results, we 
also perform calibrations and simulations under the assumption of perfect competition in 
processing. Before discussing the simulations scenarios and results, we describe the manner with 
which we calibrated our model and the data we use for this purpose.    
 
Data and Calibration 
We must calibrate the cost and demand functions using publicly available data in order to 
implement our framework. Consider first the processing sector. Under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale, the cost function associated with production of good k in region i is: 
( )ik ik ik ikG y g y= ; where ikg  is marginal cost. Ideally, marginal cost would be calibrated using the 
first-order conditions of profit maximization along with observable output and sales. However, 
sales between regions at the processing level are not available. Hence, we use marginal cost 
reported in Abbassi, Bonroy and Gervais (2008) and update the value using the consumer price 
index. Data on the technical relationship between raw milk and the processed product are taken 
from Meyer and Duteurtre (1998). Farm-level milk prices for 2006 were obtained from the 
Canadian Dairy Information Center (CDIC).  
Buyers demand schedules are calibrated using 2006 consumption data and demand 
elasticities reported in Veeman and Peng (1995) for yogurt (-0.81), cheese (-1.22) and ice cream 
(-0.68). Own-price demand elasticities for fluid milk (-0.34), butter (-0.92) and other dairy 
products are taken from (-1.02) Moschini and Moro (1993). Retail prices were obtained from 
CDIC and from the 2001 household expenditure survey of Statistics Canada. The latter prices 
were updated using the retail dairy price index. Dairy wholesale prices are only available for the 
province of Quebec. Regional variations in wholesale prices were built into the model by using a 
regional price index computed by the CDIC. In instances when it was not possible to obtain 
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either the retail or wholesale price of a commodity, a cost-plus approach was implemented to 
infer the missing price using the average retail to processing margin of the dairy industry.   
Given the existence of supply controls at the farm level, it is not possible to directly observe the 
supply response of dairy producers and compute a marginal cost function. The own-price 
elasticity of supply is set at 0.5 as in Abbassi, Bonroy and Gervais (2008). CDIC data on dairy 
production in each region, quota prices and farm gate prices can be used to construct the 
marginal cost function of producers that also hinges on a discount rate to internalize the benefits 
from holding production quotas. Following Brodeur, Doyon and Gervais (2006), we set the 
discount rate at 10%. The aforementioned assumptions yield a marginal cost estimate of $33.4 
per hl for Quebec, $33.5 in Ontario and slightly higher cost estimates in other regions (e.g., 
Prairies producers’ marginal cost is $38.2 per hl). These estimates are in line with previously 
reported estimates of marginal costs (e.g., Abbassi et al. 2008). 
Dairy product consumption on a per capita basis was obtained from Statistics Canada. 
World prices were obtained from the CDIC database. Table 1 presents information about world 
prices for each product. For butter, cheese and skim milk powder, we rely on the 2006 average 
Oceanic export prices. World prices for yogurt, ice cream, dry whey and concentrated milk were 
obtained by dividing the value of imports for each product by the volume imported minus a 
margin to account for unit transportation costs.  The world price of fluid milk is proxied by the 
US price.  
Transportation costs between Canada and the rest of the world are estimated using the 
differences between export prices and import unit values. Transportation costs for yogurt, ice 
cream, dry whey and concentrated milk are proxied by the unit transportation cost for butter. 
Unit transportation cost between provinces are based on Chavas and Cox (2001) and set equal to 
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Can$0.35 per 100 lbs per 100 miles. This value was updated using the average exchange rate and 
the price index for transportation services of Statistics Canada. Distances between regions are 
taken from Furtan and van Melle (2004) and are equal to a weighted average of the latitude and 
longitude of the most important three cities in each region.  
Table 2 presents information about the TRQ for each product. All over-quota tariffs are 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs found in Canada’s tariff schedule at the WTO. We also 
report the in-quota tariff applied to imports within the minimum access commitment of the TRQ. 
Tariff preferences for within quota imports exist for New Zealand, Australia, the USA and other 
countries, but given the relatively low in-quota tariffs, these preferences are likely to have little 
or no impact. Ad valorem tariffs were converted into specific-equivalents using the relevant 
world price. Import licenses allocations were made on the most recent year of available data 
(2003).  
The purpose of the calibration exercise is to replicate the 2005/2006 market outcomes in 
the Canadian dairy sector. The solution of the model provides a baseline to which simulations 
will be subsequently measured against. Predicted prices and quantities for the baseline solution 
are in each case less than 10 percent away from the observed values used in the calibration. The 
conditions for market segmentation are also respected because wholesale price differences across 
markets are larger than transportation costs. Finally, the 2005/2006 wholesale butter price in the 
baseline solution is higher than the support price and thus support is non-binding in the baseline 
solution. 
 
Simulations 
Simulations are carried out to estimate the impacts of trade liberalization in the Canadian dairy 
sector. Reductions in import tariffs are based on the latest revised draft modalities (a sort of 
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blueprint for the final deal) made in December of 2008 and involve multiple tier reductions 
(WTO, 2008). Developed countries may be able in a future agreement to identify between 4 or 6 
percent of their tariff lines as sensitive. Tariff cuts for sensitive products could be one-third, one-
half or two-thirds of the “normal” tier cuts. Under this proposal, the minimum reduction applied 
to over-quota tariffs of dairy TRQs would be 22 percent while the maximal cut applied could be 
49%. In return for the ability to implement less aggressive tariff cuts, developed countries would 
be asked to expand the minimum access commitment of the TRQ to around 5 to 6 percent of 
domestic consumption, depending on the extent of the tariff exemption allowed.  
We consider two liberalization scenarios. In both scenarios, we assume that dairy 
products are identified as sensitive. The scenarios are labeled “aggressive” (A) and “moderate” 
(M): 
Scenario A: Over-quota tariffs are cut by 49 percent and in-quota tariffs are eliminated. The 
minimum access commitment is set at 5 percent of domestic consumption.  
Scenario M : Over-quota tariffs are cut by 22 percent and in-quota tariffs are reduced to zero. 
Given the less ambitious cuts to over-quota tariffs, it is assumed that minimum access 
commitment is increased to 6 percent of domestic consumption. 
Table 3 presents the impact of the two liberalization scenarios on prices and quantities.  
In scenario A, tariff cuts trigger imports of cheese and butter over the minimum access 
commitment. These impacts as well as the increase in the minimum access commitment lower 
the residual demand faced by domestic firms in all sectors, especially for cheese and butter. 
Cheese and butter prices decrease on average by 14.4 and 32.1%, respectively, while total output 
in Canada decreases by 25.5% for cheese and 56.9% for butter.  
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The lower output of processed products implies a decrease in the demand for milk at the 
farm level. Table 4 reports the impacts of trade liberalization on quota values7 and farm prices.  
We do so by province and nationally because the dairy industry is relatively more important for 
Quebec and Ontario than for the Prairies.  Opposition to trade liberalization for dairy products is 
also strongest in Quebec and Ontario. The farm price decreases by 17.8% in the Prairies and by 
16.4% in Quebec and Ontario. Because the lower farm price decreases the marginal cost of 
processors, increases in production are observed for some sectors in spite of the enlargement of 
the minimum access commitments. For skim milk powder, output increases by 21.1% and the 
average wholesale price is reduced by 7.0%. In the fluid milk and yogurt markets, output 
increases by 6.6 and 2.4%, respectively, while average wholesale prices decrease by 5.3 and 
2.9%. 
Table 5 presents the impacts of liberalization on producers, processors and buyers 
surplus.8 Under scenario A, buyers’ surplus increases by 42.8% in Canada due to lower 
wholesale prices. In Ontario, Quebec and the Prairies, buyers’ surplus increases, respectively, by 
43.1%, 39.0% and 46.4%. At the wholesale level, the decrease in wholesale prices and the 
overall impact on output triggers an average decrease of 64.6% in processors’ surplus. Quebec 
and Ontario processors are impacted the most as their surplus falls by 73.0% and 73.6%, 
respectively. The surplus of Canadian dairy producers falls by 21.2% and the magnitude of the 
impact is similar across regions. Overall, scenario A increases welfare by 12.5 %, which 
translates into a gain of $1.078 billion per year for the Canadian dairy sector.  
Under scenario M, duty-free market access is larger and over-quota tariffs are lowered by 
22 percent. In this case, only butter imports occur at the over-quota tariff. The reduction in over-
                                                 
7
 Dairy quota values are equal to the production quota rent plus the benefits linked to the price discrimination policy.  
 
8
 Producers’ surplus includes the quota value.  
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quota tariff is not large enough to trigger imports above the minimum access as in scenario A for 
all other commodities. The increase in minimum access has a significant impact in all sectors 
except for cheese and skimmed milk powder for which current minimum access is already quite 
high.  At the national level, the production of outputs of yogurt, fluid milk and butter fall by 
2.8%, 0.5% and 21.7%, respectively. 
At the farm level, the milk price and the quota value fall due to the lower demand by 
domestic processors. In comparison to the more aggressive scenario, the impacts are small. Milk 
prices decrease by 4.9% in the Prairies, 4.0% in Quebec and 4.1% in Ontario. The lower farm 
prices reduce processors’ marginal cost and increase output of cheese and skim milk powder by 
1.2% and 6.0%, respectively. Table 4 reports that the surplus of buyers increases by 9.4 percent 
for Canada and the distribution of gains is fairly even across regions. The surplus of Canadian 
dairy processors would fall by 9.4% under scenario M. Processors located in Quebec and Ontario 
are the most affected by this liberalization plan as their surplus falls by 16.4% and 15.5%, 
respectively. Canadian dairy producers see their surplus fall by 5.3%. The net impact of 
liberalization under scenario M is an increase in surplus of 2.7 percent for the Canadian dairy 
sector, which amounts to a gain of $234.5 million per year. 
We now wish to compare the above trade liberalization outcomes derived under the 
assumption of imperfect competition to outcomes for similar scenarios, but obtained under 
perfect competition.9. Table 6 presents the effects of the trade liberalization scenarios on the 
surpluses of the various agents and on aggregate welfare. At the aggregate level, trade 
liberalization increases consumer surplus and welfare. Regardless of the trade scenario 
considered, imports do not increase beyond the minimum access commitment threshold.  As a 
                                                 
9
 Under perfect competition, processors simply act as pass-through agents of producers. They do not behave 
strategically and their surplus is equal to zero because of the assumption of constant returns to scale in processing 
activities.  
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result, increases in imports can only be brought about by changes in minimum access 
commitments and this explains why variations in surpluses and in welfare are larger under 
scenario M.  Our simulation results indicate that trade liberalization would increase aggregate 
welfare by $34.5 million under scenario M and by $15.6 million under scenario A. As per our 
theoretical prior, trade liberalization produces much larger gains under the assumption of an 
imperfectly competitive processing sector than under the perfect competition assumption.  This 
is primarily due to the double marginalization problem when processing firms have strategic 
interactions. Our results under perfect competition are lower from the ones reported in Abbassi, 
Bonroy and Gervais (2008) which vary between $48 million and $64 million per year. Both sets 
of results are not directly comparable because of differences in the calibrating year, in the trade 
liberalization scenarios investigated and in the manner with which price discrimination mark-ups 
in the pricing of milk are modeled.  
Table 7 presents the impacts of liberalization on the interregional deadweight losses 
arising because of transport costs of dairy products. Under scenario A, decreases in domestic 
output for products like butter and cheese would tend to decrease the volume of « interprovincial 
dumping », but output increases in other dairy products would have the opposite effect. The net 
effect of aggressive international trade liberalization is an increase in interprovincial trade. This 
gives rise to an increase of 2.5 percent in transportation costs between regions. In Brander and 
Krugman (1983), reciprocal dumping increases competition, but transportation costs increase 
sourcing inefficiencies which give rise to a non-monotonic relation between welfare and per unit 
transportation cost. Under scenario M, there is less interprovincial trade than in the baseline 
situation because decreases in the production of fluid milk, butter and yogurt more than offset 
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increases in the production of cheese and skim milk powder. As a result, interprovincial 
transportation cost decreases by 0.9 percent.   
Transportation costs being fairly low, it should come as no surprise that small increases in 
per unit transportation cost reduce welfare. The theoretical results of Brander and Krugman 
(1983) showed that increases in per unit transportation cost can actually increase welfare once a 
certain threshold is reached, corresponding to a minimum welfare level. This occurs because 
firms with a higher per unit cost (production and transport) are disadvantaged but not necessarily 
driven out of a market in which firms have Cournot conjectures. In our model, the threshold 
occurs at a level of per unit transportation cost that is 10.6 times the benchmark level.  
Additional increases in per unit transportation cost increase welfare until all interprovincial 
dumping ceases. This occurs at a per unit transportation cost that is 75.7 times the benchmark 
level. When this occurs, there is no interprovincial dumping and hence no sourcing waste , but 
the lack of competition is such that welfare under the benchmark per unit transport cost is much 
higher.  While the non-monotonic relation between transportation cost and welfare is interesting 
from a theoretical standpoint, it does not have important implications in the case of 
interprovincial dumping of dairy products.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper measures the impacts of trade liberalization on the supply-managed Canadian dairy 
industry under an imperfectly competitive market structure.  Our spatial equilibrium framework 
accounts for production limits at the farm level and other important features of the supply 
management policy. More specifically, it allows producers to practice price discrimination. Dairy 
processing firms compete with one another using Cournot conjectures and engage in 
interprovincial dumping as in Brander and Krugman’s (1983) reciprocal dumping model. 
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International trade is hindered by restrictive Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs). The model features 5 
regions and 8 different products. 
Two liberalization scenarios were investigated. In the more aggressive (A) scenario, 
welfare gains are estimated to be $1078 million whereas in the moderate (M) scenario, welfare 
gains were estimated at $ 234.5 million. The differences between the two scenarios stem from 
the differences in tariff reductions. In the more conservative liberalization scenario, increases in 
duty-free market access are not large enough to compensate the relatively timid reductions in 
tariffs.  We also simulated the same scenarios when processing firms behave as perfectly 
competitive firms and found much smaller gains from trade. 
The regional distribution of milk and dairy products production is mainly concentrated in 
the provinces of Quebec and Ontario.  However, because these provinces have relatively large 
populations, they both stand to gain from trade liberalization even though milk producers and 
dairy processors stand to lose.  Given that it is easier to mobilize smaller groups, opposition to 
trade liberalization has been and is expected to remain strong in spite of the sizeable gains that 
could be achieved for specific provinces and for Canada as a whole.  Canada’s efforts on slowing 
down the pace of trade liberalization on its supply-managed sectors in the Uruguay and Doha 
Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations are misplaced.   
As in the Brander and Krugman (1983) model, we found a non-monotonic relationship 
between welfare and per unit transportation cost. However, the threshold at which an increase in 
transportation costs increases welfare is very large, making this result more of a theoretical 
curioso than a policy relevant feature, in the case of the supply-managed Canadian dairy 
industry.    
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Table 1. World prices 
 
Product 
 World prices 
($/kg) 
Fluid milk   0.7 
Yogurt   2.8 
Powdered buttermilk  2.7 
Butter   2.0 
Cheese     3.3 
Ice Cream  3.2 
Concentrated milk  1.5 
Skim milk powder    2.5 
Source: CDIC database, 2006  
Notes: the 2006  world prices were converted in  Canadian 
dollars using an average exchange rate of Can$1.134/US$ . 
                                        
                                             
 
Table 2. In-quota and over-quota tariffs and minimum 
access commitments of Canadian dairy TRQs 
 
Product 
  
MAC (MT) 
 In-quota 
tariff (%) 
 Over-quota 
tariff (%) 
Fluid milk   64,500  7.5  241.0 
Yogurt   332  6.5  237.5 
Powdered buttermilk  908  1.21  208.0 
Butter   3,274  5.72  298.5 
Cheese     20,412  1.03  245.5 
Ice Cream  347  6.5  277.1 
Concentrated milk  12  2.24  243.0 
Skim milk powder    4,345   6.5  270.1 
Source: AMAD Tariff database (www.amad.org)  
Notes: Some in-quota tariffs are specific tariffs and were converted in ad-valorem terms 
using the world price. 1The specific tariff for powdered buttermilk is 3.32 ckg (cents per kg). 
2The specific tariff for butter is 11.38 ckg. 3The specific tariff for cheese is 3.32 ckg. 4The 
specific tariff for concentrated milk is 2.84 ckg.  
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Table 3.  Trade liberalization impacts on output and average prices  
of processed products in Canada 
  
Fluid milk  Butter  Cheese  Skim milk powder  
 
Yogurt 
Production (Baseline - 000 MT)  2403.2  74.5  386.6  60.6  160.8 
   Scenario A (% change)  6.6  -56.9  -25.5  21.1  2.4 
   Scenario M   -0.5  -21.7  1.2  6.0  -2.8 
           
Average Price (baseline - $ / kg)  1.5  7.8  9.1  6.3  4.1 
   Scenario A (% change)  -5.3  -32.1  -14.4  -7.0  -2.9 
   Scenario M   -2.4  -11.5  -1.3  -2.2  -1.6 
 
 
Table 4. Trade liberalization impacts at the farm level 
 
 
  Prairies  Ontario  Quebec 
Farm price (Baseline - $ / hl)  83.3  82.3  82.9 
Scenario A (% change)  -17.8  -16.4  -16.4 
Scenario M   -4.9  -4.1  -4.0 
       
Quota value (baseline - $ / hl)   45,1  48,8  49,5 
Scenario A (% change)  -19.0  -13.1  -13.0 
Scenario M   -9.1  -3,7  -3.2 
       
Farm output (baseline - 000 MT)   1273,8  1554,9  1575,7 
Scenario A (% change)  -8,2  -10,6  -10,7 
Scenario M   0,0  -2.4  -2.6 
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Table 5. Trade liberalization impacts on welfare 
 
Table 6. Trade liberalization impacts on welfare under perfect competition in processing 
  Prairies  Ontario  Quebec  Canada 
Welfare 
(Baseline - $million)  
 
1730,2  
 
2750,0  
 
2534,9  8615,4 
Scenario A  (% change)  9.6  13.5  11.2  12.5 
Scenario M  2.1  2.8  2.7  2.7 
         
Buyer surplus 
(baseline - $million)  376.7  988.2  759.1  2643 
Scenario A  (% change)  46.4  43.1  39.0  42.8 
Scenario M    10.2  9.4  8.6  9.4 
         
Processor surplus 
(Baseline - $million)  277.2  391.1  406.2  1238.1 
Scenario A  (%change)  -68.9  -73.6  -73.0  -64.6 
Scenario M    -0.3  -15.5  -16.4  -9.4 
         
Producer surplus 
(Baseline - $million)   1061.4  1279.3  1306.2  4545.6 
Scenario A  (% change)  -21.1  -21.4  -21.5  -21.2 
Scenario M    -4.9  -5.5  -5.5  -5.3 
  Prairies  Ontario  Quebec  Canada 
Welfare 
(Baseline - $million)  
 
2089,2  
 
3793,9  
 
3167,7  11148,7 
Scenario A  (% change)  0.06  0.12  0.16  0.14 
Scenario M  0.12  0.35  0.37  0.31 
         
Buyer surplus 
(baseline - $million)  900,4  2244,5  1559,4  5865,9 
Scenario A  (% change)  1.43  1.45  1.57  1.52 
Scenario M    2.00  2.14  2.29  2.18 
         
Producer surplus 
(Baseline - $million)   1182,1  1505,3  1576,7  5192,3 
Scenario A  (% change)  -1.91  -1.96  -1.93  -1.94 
Scenario M    -2.90  -2.96  -2.91  -2.96 
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Table 7. Trade liberalization impacts on the cost of interregional trade 
 Interregional  
trade cost 
Baseline ($million) 263.3 
Scenario A (% change) 2.5 
Scenario M  -0.9 
 
 
 
 
